NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 94 | Number 6

Article 7

9-1-2016

Overcoming the Rippy Effect: Why the North
Carolina Business Corporations Act Should Allow
Permissive Officer Exculpation
Jordan C. Hilton

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Jordan C. Hilton, Overcoming the Rippy Effect: Why the North Carolina Business Corporations Act Should Allow Permissive Officer
Exculpation, 94 N.C. L. Rev. 2155 (2016).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol94/iss6/7

This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North
Carolina Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
law_repository@unc.edu.

94 N.C. L. REV. 2155 (2016)

Overcoming the Rippy Effect: Why the North Carolina
Business Corporations Act Should Allow Permissive Officer
Exculpation*

INTRODUCTION
What if, in the popular board game Monopoly, “Get Out of Jail
Free” cards could only be drawn by a predetermined segment of
players?1 Further, what if the opportunity to draw the liberating
vouchers was based on an arbitrary distinction2 that had no bearing
on past or future performance? In all likelihood, players who could
draw “Get Out of Jail Free” cards would engage in riskier and
potentially more rewarding behavior than their opportunity-less
counterparts because they might be able to “avoid jail” even after an
unfortunate roll of the dice. Eventually, inducing opportunity-less
gamers to play at all might prove problematic.
If corporate management can be considered the game—and
directors and officers the players—then the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit in F.D.I.C. ex rel. Cooperative Bank v. Rippy3 recently
interpreted North Carolina law to dictate that only directors have the
chance to draw the little orange cards. In Rippy, the court held that
while bank directors were not liable for ordinary negligence, sufficient
evidence was presented to rebut the presumption that bank officers
had acted on an informed basis.4 The Rippy court interpreted the
exculpatory provision as allowing exculpation for directors5—but not

* © 2016 Jordan C. Hilton.
1. The Parker Brothers game allows players to buy, rent, and sell properties in an
effort to bankrupt other players and become the wealthiest player. Parker Bros.,
Monopoly Parker Brothers Real Estate Trading Game, HASBRO.COM (2016), http://
www.hasbro.com/common/instruct/monins.pdf [https://perma.cc/H2KV-XZKX]. “Get Out
of Jail Free” cards allow players who would otherwise be forced to miss a turn waiting in
“jail” to circumvent that obstacle and continue playing without interruption. Id. In a game
predicated on generating money by “passing go” each turn, “Get Out of Jail Free” cards
provide a significant advantage. See id.
2. For example, if there were a rule that permitted only players with last names
beginning with letters A–H to be eligible for the bonus cards.
3. 799 F.3d 301 (4th Cir. 2015).
4. Id. at 313.
5. The Rippy court found that exculpation was not available to directors in cases of
gross negligence. Id. This Recent Development concerns only breaches of care pursuant to
ordinary negligence. See infra note 85.
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officers.6 Central to the Rippy court’s finding of no liability for
directors was their analysis of an exculpatory provision contained in
the bank’s bylaws and permitted by the North Carolina Business
Corporations Act (“NCBCA”).7 Although the bank’s directors and
officers engaged in the same negligent behavior, only the officers
were exposed to liability.8
This Recent Development argues that the NCBCA9 should be
amended to allow permissive officer exculpation in corporate
charters. Analysis proceeds in four parts. Part I examines the Rippy
facts and holding, and explains the genesis and evolution of
exculpatory clauses. Part II argues that (1) North Carolina’s
management-insulating provisions leave a problematic “gap” in
liability coverage for officers, (2) the marginal deterrent effect against
officer misbehavior via liability pursuant to non-exculpation is likely
outweighed by the costs of enforcing a non-officer exculpating
scheme, and (3) the current lack of officer exculpation allows for
inequitable and confusing outcomes as between directors and officers.
Part III addresses counterarguments, and Part IV concludes by
recommending that the NCBCA be revised to allow for officer
exculpation.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Facts and Procedural Posture of Rippy
Cooperative Bank (“Cooperative”) opened in 1898 and focused
its operations on single-family housing loans for nearly a century.10
Determined to increase bank assets, Cooperative’s Board of
Directors shifted its focus to commercial real estate loans in 2002.11
Because the FDIC12 backed Cooperative, the FDIC performed
annual reviews13 of Cooperative’s underwriting and loaning

6. Rippy, 799 F.3d at 313.
7. Id. at 312; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-2-02 (2015).
8. § 55-2-02.
9. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-2-02 outlines permissive exculpation for directors in
corporate charters and is a sensible place to position the proposed amendment. See infra
notes 29–35 and accompanying text.
10. Rippy, 799 F.3d at 313.
11. Id.
12. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) encourages borrowing
and loaning activity because “insured deposits are backed by the full faith and credit of the
United States Government.” 12 U.S.C. § 1828(a)(1)(B) (2014).
13. The FDIC performed reviews in conjunction with the North Carolina
Commission of Banks (“NCCB”). Rippy, 799 F.3d at 307.
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practices.14 While these initial reports15 were relatively favorable, each
report recommended changes and all of the feedback got
progressively worse.16 The final report,17 condemning both
Cooperative’s cursory approval of nine large loans to land developers
and their rampant use of equity-less “lot loans,”18 gave Cooperative
the worst possible score in all but one category.19
Cooperative did not address the issues highlighted in the
reports.20 During the Great Recession in 2009, Cooperative closed21
and named the FDIC as receiver.22 The FDIC subsequently sued

14. Id. at 308.
15. “Cooperative was scored in each of the following categories: Capital, Asset
Quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity to Market Risk. The
examination categories collectively are commonly referred to by the acronym CAMELS,
and are scored on scale [sic] from 1–5, with ‘1’ being the best and ‘5’ being the worst.” Id.
at 307–08.
16. Five reports are relevant. First, a 2006 FDIC report gave Cooperative a “2” rating
in each of the CAMELS categories and recommended that Cooperative address issues in
credit administration, underwriting, audit practices, risk management, and liquidity. Id. at
308. A 2007 NCCB investigation yielded a substantially similar report. Id. Third, an
external review by Credit Risk Management (CRM), in addition to finding that
Cooperative had been slow to address its previously identified issues, suggested that
Cooperative review its credit files on a more regular basis. Id. In 2008, CRM issued a
fourth report, again criticizing loan documentation and monitoring, and for the first time,
assessing failing grades to certain loans. Id. Finally, the FDIC and NCCB issued a joint
report in November 2008, giving the lowest possible rating to Cooperative in all but one of
the CAMELS categories. Id.
17. Id. (FDIC and NCCB Joint Report).
18. A “[m]anufactured home lot loan means a loan for the purchase or refinancing of
a portion of land acceptable to the Secretary as a manufactured home lot.” 24 C.F.R.
§ 201.2 (2015). Cooperative encouraged customers to utilize lot loans by presenting
investment seminars. After attending the investment seminar, optimistic customers
became certain that he or she could buy a building lot without putting up any money for
two years. The idea was to “flip” the lot to someone else as property values continued to
climb. Floyd Norris, Failed Bank’s Broken Vows Mean Little, N.Y. TIMES Sep. 19, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/19/business/in-ruling-that-favors-failed-bank-promisesmeant-little.html [https://perma.cc/587U-5H92].
19. Rippy, 799 F.3d at 307–08 (stating that Cooperative scored “fives” in the Capital,
Asset Quality, Management, Earnings, and Liquidity categories, and a “four” in the
Sensitivity to Market Risk category).
20. Id. at 313. The FDIC’s expert witness stated that both directors and officers
“approved loans over the telephone, without first examining the relevant documents.” Id.
21. According to a review conducted by the FDIC Office of Inspector General, the
FDIC suffered losses of over $200 million due to Cooperative’s failure. Id. at 309.
22. The FDIC is statutorily authorized to function in two separate and distinct
capacities. “[T]he [FDIC, as a corporation] shall insure the deposits of all insured banks,”
12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1) (2012), and the FDIC shall “as receiver of a closed national
bank . . . have the right to appoint an agent or agents to assist it in its duties as such
receiver.” § 1822(a). See Rippy, 799 F.3d at 307 n.1 (describing FDIC’s receiver capacity).
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Cooperative’s directors23 and officers24 for negligence, gross
negligence, and breach of fiduciary duties.25 When the district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants,26 the FDIC
appealed to the Fourth Circuit.27
B.

Holdings

The Rippy court28 held that, while North Carolina law
contemplates suits against bank directors and officers sounding in
ordinary negligence,29 Cooperative’s directors were shielded from
liability by an exculpatory provision contained in Cooperative’s
articles of incorporation.30 Conversely, the Rippy court observed
simply that “[Cooperative]’s exculpatory provision does not cover
[Cooperative’s] officers.”31 Because the officers were shielded from
liability by the business judgment rule32 but not by the articles of
23. The nine director-defendants were: Willetts (chief executive officer), Burton
(director), King (director), Wright (director), Rippy (director), Fensel (director), Bridger
(director), Hundley (director), and Burrell (director). See Complaint at 2–3, FDIC v.
Willetts, 48 F. Supp. 3d 844 (E.D.N.C. 2014) (7:11-cv-00165-BO); Lance Duroni, FDIC
Loses $40M Suit Against NC Community Bank Execs, LAW360 (Sept. 12, 2014, 7:48 PM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/576912/fdic-loses-40m-suit-against-nc-community-bank-execs
[https://perma.cc/QC6S-D9DE].
24. The officers were: Executive Vice-President of Mortgage Lending Bridger and
Chief Operating Officer Burrell, who both attended almost all board meetings. Complaint,
supra note 23, at 3.
25. Rippy, 799 F.3d at 308.
26. “The Court finds that defendants are entitled to the business judgment rule’s
protection as a matter of law and indisputable fact. Therefore the Court enters judgment
against plaintiff’s claims for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty.” FDIC v. Willetts, 48
F. Supp. 3d 844, 851 (E.D.N.C. 2014) aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part sub nom.
Rippy, 799 F.3d at 301.
27. Rippy, 799 F.3d at 309–10.
28. Throughout this Recent Development, “Rippy court” refers to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and “Willetts court” refers to the Eastern District
of North Carolina.
29. Rippy, 799 F.3d at 311.
30. “The exculpatory clause protects directors from monetary liability unless the
directors ‘knew or believed [that their acts or omissions] were clearly in conflict’ with
[Cooperative]’s best interests.” Id. at 312–13 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-2-02(b)(3)
(2012)).
31. Rippy, 799 F.3d at 313.
32. The business judgment rule is a common law presumption that “in making a
business decision the directors . . . acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.” Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); see also Constance Frisby Fain, Corporate Director
and Officer Liability, 18 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 417, 439 (1996) (examining the
business judgment rule’s development in conjunction with the duty of care concept);
Stephen P. Lamb & Joseph Christensen, Duty Follows Function: Two Approaches to
Curing the Mismatch Between the Fiduciary Duties and Potential Personal Liability of
Corporate Officers, 26 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 45, 51 (2012) (“The
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incorporation, the Rippy court found that the FDIC had presented
adequate evidence to rebut the initial presumption that the officerdefendants acted on an informed basis.33 The officers, the Rippy court
held, could be personally liable for simple negligence.34
Cooperative’s exculpatory provision did not cover officers
because it could not cover officers under current North Carolina
law.35 While the nine defendants were accused of essentially the same
acts and omissions,36 the statutory limitations on permissive
exculpation in the NCBCA precluded Cooperative’s officers from
receiving the same level of protection as their director colleagues.37
Hence, Rippy effectively highlights the “gap” in liability coverage
between directors and officers that can arise in duty of care cases. To
better understand why the liability gap should be closed, some
background information regarding the origins of director exculpation
is required.
C.

Exculpation as a Response to Van Gorkom

The lack of officer exculpation in North Carolina38 is best
explained as an accident of history and should be conceptualized as a
product of Smith v. Van Gorkom.39 In Van Gorkom, the chairman of
the board and CEO Van Gorkom was faced with a decision to sell the
company.40 After cursory negotiations with a single bidder, Van
business judgment rule sets the fundamental parameters within which control can be
exercised. It forms a sort of compact between the stockholders and the management to
whom they are entrusting their capital. The compact is that management will be permitted
to use the stockholders’ capital to operate the corporation in their best judgment without
second-guessing by the stockholders (using the courts as the vehicle for such secondguessing) so long as management does so in pursuit of the corporation’s best interests. In
other words, the stockholder gives up his wealth to the corporation and irrevocably
confers discretion on management to employ that wealth profitably.”) (internal citations
omitted); Lawrence A. Hamermesh & A. Gilchrist Sparks III, Corporate Officers and the
Business Judgment Rule: A Reply to Professor Johnson, 60 BUS. LAW. 865, 870 (2005)
(arguing that the business judgment rule should be applied to corporate officers).
33. Rippy, 799 F.3d at 313.
34. Id.
35. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-2-02(b)(3) (2015) (allowing for permissive exculpation of
directors but not officers).
36. Rippy, 799 F.3d at 314. Of the nine negligently approved commercial real estate
(CRE) loans, officers and directors approved eight of them together. Complaint, supra
note 23, at 14.
37. See infra Section II.A.
38. The North Carolina statute is the Model Business Corporations Act provision
that follows the Delaware pattern.
39. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), overruled by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del.
2009).
40. Id. at 865.
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Gorkom presented the board with a proposed merger at $55 per
share.41 Following a two-hour oral presentation, the board decided to
sell the company.42 The Delaware Supreme Court ultimately held that
by failing to adequately deliberate about the proposed merger, the
directors breached their duty of care.43
In response to this holding and in an attempt to protect directors,
the Delaware legislature adopted Rule 102(b)(7),44 which allows for
director (but not officer)45 exculpation if a court finds that the
director-defendant did not breach the duty of loyalty. Commentators
have suggested that 102(b)(7) effectively overruled the effect of Van
Gorkom,46 but such assertions give short shrift to the potential47
liability of officers in some duty of care cases.48 While Van Gorkom
exposed both officers and directors, 102(b)(7) and its progeny, for
reasons discussed below,49 only protects directors. If Van Gorkom, by
analogy, entirely removed “Get Out of Jail Free Cards” from the
corporate governance game, then Rule 102(b)(7) reintroduced cards
that only directors could use. Hence, assertions that directorexculpating provisions wholly erase the effect of Van Gorkom are
premature because officers are still partially exposed.50
D. The Lack of Officer Exculpation: An Accident of History?
There are at least two reasons why Rule 102(b)(7), and parallel
state laws (including North Carolina’s) that have followed the rule51
exclude officers from permissive exculpation: (1) the decision of the
41. Id. at 866–68.
42. Id. at 868–69.
43. Id. at 874.
44. For the purposes of this Recent Development, Rule 102(b)(7) claims are used to
generally describe claims based on director exculpation.
45. “The view was that [102(b)(7)] did not . . . extend exculpation to officers, except
insofar as an officer was ‘exercis[ing] the authority of a director.’ Moreover, the Delaware
Supreme Court all but foreclosed that argument when it noted in Gantler that ‘[a]lthough
legislatively possible, there currently is no statutory provision authorizing comparable
exculpation of corporate officers.’ ” Lamb & Christensen, supra note 32, at 58.
46. See, e.g., id. at 56–57.
47. While “[t]he exclusion of officers from exculpation has so far been a sleeping
dog, . . . if and when it wakes, . . . it w[ill] be destructive to the rational incentive structures
reclaimed and rebuilt after Van Gorkom.” Id. at 47.
48. See, e.g., FDIC v. Loudermilk, 984 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1361–62 (N.D. Ga. 2013)
(holding officers liable for breaching their duty of care by failing to maintain appropriate
ratios of speculative and low-risk loans).
49. See infra Section I.D.
50. As one commentator has noted, “the chilly winds of Smith v. Van Gorkom still
blow through the boardroom.” Paul Graf, A Realistic Approach to Officer Liability, 66
BUS. LAW. 315, 336 (2011).
51. See supra note 38.
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Van Gorkom court to limit its holding to director liability and (2)
Delaware’s (pre-2004) pro-officer jurisprudence of personal
jurisdiction.52
Because Van Gorkom imposed liability on directors, it was
directors—particularly outside directors53—who sought relief.54
Because most corporate officers at the time were simultaneously
serving as directors, “there seemed to be little need for extending
protection to officers qua officers.”55 While the director/officer
distinction may not have been crucial in the Van Gorkom analysis,
Rippy56 and other decisions57 leave little doubt about contemporary
courts’ willingness to distinguish between officers and directors in
duty of care cases.
A second reason for officer exclusion in Delaware’s (and North
Carolina’s) exculpatory statute can be explained by examining the law
of personal jurisdiction. Delaware passed a sequestration statute that
allowed plaintiffs to sequester stock that directors owned in the
subject corporation if directors did not appear in litigation
proceedings.58 Directors challenged this statute in Shaffer v. Heitner,
where the Court struck it down as violative of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.59 To rectify the defects in their
sequestration statute, the Delaware legislature passed Section 3114,
which provided that persons who accept service as a director are
deemed to have consented to Delaware jurisdiction.60 However,
“[a]bsent traditional bases of personal jurisdiction, . . . Delaware
courts [still] could not hale officers of Delaware corporations into
their courts under Section 3114—officers would be able to cite Shaffer
as precluding the exercise of such jurisdiction.”61 In 2004, an
52. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); see text accompanying infra notes 58–67.
53. An outside director is “[a]ny member of a company’s board of directors who is
not an employee or stakeholder in the company.” Outside Director Definition,
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/o/outsidedirector.asp#ixzz3r90YJ1DO
[https://perma.cc/VGF4-GWBK].
54. Dennis R. Honabach, Smith v. Van Gorkom: Managerial Liability and
Exculpatory Clauses—A Proposal to Fill the Gap of the Missing Officer Protection, 45
WASHBURN L.J. 307, 307 (2006).
55. Id.
56. See supra notes 29–34 and accompanying text.
57. See, e.g., McPadden v. Sidhu, 964 A.2d 1262, 1274–76 (Del. Ch. 2008) (holding
non-director CEO liable for negligence while affirming efficacy of director-exculpating
clause).
58. Act of July 7, 1977, ch. 119, 61 Del. Laws 328, 328 (codified at DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 10, § 3114(a) (2015)); Lamb & Christensen, supra note 32, at 60.
59. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216–17 (1977).
60. 61 Del. Laws at 328.
61. Lamb & Christensen, supra note 32, at 60.
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amendment provided that persons who accept service as an officer of
a Delaware corporation after January 1, 2004, are subject to
Delaware jurisdiction in the same way as directors.62
The historical reasons for categorically excluding officers from
exculpation, while never logically compelling, apply now with less
force than ever. First, some modern corporate governance structures
routinely require officers to perform directorial functions while
remaining non-director officers.63 Hence, while failing to distinguish
between officers and directors for the purposes of exculpation
eligibility may not have been terribly problematic at the time of Van
Gorkom, the contemporary corporate governance structure
represented in Rippy undoubtedly highlights the problems inherent in
such a failure to so distinguish today. Further, the statutory restraints
that limited the ability of plaintiffs to hale officer defendants into
court no longer exist.64 While plaintiffs’ historical statutory inability to
hale officers into court may have justified officers’ original exclusion
from exculpation, the removal of plaintiff limitations means that
exculpation for officers is no longer a redundancy. Given these
developments and the growing number of states that have amended
their laws to allow officer exculpation,65 the lack of permissive officer
exculpation generally66—and in North Carolina specifically67—is best
explained as a readily amendable accident of history.
II. WHY PERMISSIVE OFFICER EXCULPATION MAKES SENSE
Given the defects of 102(b)(7) and its progeny, this Recent
Development argues that the NCBCA should be amended to allow
permissive officer exculpation for at least three reasons. First, the lack
of officer exculpation leaves a legally significant gap in liability
coverage for officers. Second, while the gap between officers and
directors is significant, the marginal effect on officer behavior that

62. Act of June 30, 2003, ch. 83, sec. 3, § 18-213(f), 74 Del. Laws 213, 213 (2003).
63. See infra Section II.C.
64. See infra Section II.C.
65. Several states have adopted permissive exculpation for officers: Maryland,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Utah, and Virginia. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS.
& ASS’NS §§ 2-104(b)(8), 2-405.2 (LexisNexis 2015), MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC.
§ 5-418 (West 2015); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.138(7) (West 2015); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 293-A:2.02(b)(4) (2016); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:2-7(3) (West 2016); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 16-10a-840(4) (West 2015); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-692.1 (2011), respectively.
66. See generally MARK A. SARGENT & DENNIS R. HONABACH, D&O LIABILITY
HANDBOOK (West ed., Oct. 2015) (discussing various state provisions).
67. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-2-02(b)(3) (2015) (exculpation allowed only for
directors); § 55-8-51 (indemnification available to directors and officers).
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potential liability for negligence via non-exculpation may have is
likely outweighed by the costs of enforcing the current statutory
scheme. Third, the current lack of officer exculpation allows for
inequitable and confusing outcomes as between directors and officers.
A. North Carolina’s Business Corporations Act Leaves a
Problematic “Gap” in Liability Coverage for Officers
North Carolina’s Business Corporations Act insulates directors
from liability to a greater extent than it insulates officers. Directors
may be exculpated68 and indemnified,69 while officers may only70 be
indemnified.71 While both exculpation and indemnification are
management-insulating devices, the differences between exculpation
and indemnification are more than semantic. Exculpation is superior
to indemnification as a protective shield because (1) exculpation is
effective regardless of the defendant company’s solvency,72
(2) indemnification covers only “reasonable expenses” incurred in the
case of a settlement,73 and (3) exculpated defendants accused of
ordinary negligence may be able to move for dismissal at the motionto-dismiss stage of litigation.74
First, exculpation is superior to indemnification because, unlike
indemnification agreements, the efficacy of exculpatory clauses is not
dependent on company solvency.75 As others have noted, the
68. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-2-02 (2015) (“The articles of incorporation may set forth
any provision that under this Chapter is required or permitted to be set forth in the
bylaws, and may also set forth: . . . A provision limiting or eliminating the personal liability
of any director arising out of an action whether by or in the right of the corporation or
otherwise for monetary damages for breach of any duty as a director. No such provision
shall be effective with respect to (i) acts or omissions that the director at the time of such
breach knew or believed were clearly in conflict with the best interests of the
corporation.”) (emphasis added).
69. § 55-8-51.
70. Insurance, while available to officers, does not cover suits brought against officers
by the corporation. See infra note 155.
71. § 55-8-42(e).
72. See infra notes 75–78 and accompanying text.
73. See infra notes 79–80 and accompanying text.
74. See infra notes 81–84 and accompanying text.
75. J. Phil Carlton & M. Guy Brooks, Corporate Director and Officer
Indemnification: Alternative Methods for Funding, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 53, 58
(1989); see also Ronald E. Mallen & David W. Evans, Surviving the Directors’ and
Officers’ Liability Crisis: Insurance and the Alternatives, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 439, 466
(1987) (“The failing of any indemnification agreement is that even if such an agreement is
valid, its significance depends upon the financial stability of the corporation. For the
established, financially solid corporation indemnification agreements afford meaningful
and reliable protection for directors and officers. For the newly formed or thinly
capitalized company, the protection of the indemnity agreement may be illusory. Many
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deficiency of indemnification is that the “offer [to indemnify] is only
as good as the ability and willingness of the corporation to pay.”76
When corporations become insolvent, as Cooperative did,77 corporate
officers seeking to enforce indemnity claims necessarily compete with
other creditors.78 No such problem exists for exculpated defendants.
Second, exculpation is superior to indemnification because in
North Carolina, indemnified (but not exculpated) defendants must
pay the “unreasonable” costs incurred in any litigation proceedings
that do not end in a final adjudication.79 Unlike only indemnified
defendants, exculpated persons may avoid litigation of the messy
“reasonableness” question and receive protection from all costs
related to the litigation and settlement of the matter.80
Third, exculpatory clauses may provide defendants with tactical
litigation advantages which indemnification does not. If exculpated,
directors accused of duty of care breaches may successfully move for
dismissal without expending the resources necessary for a trial.81
While the paucity of non-Delaware case law regarding director
exculpation makes North Carolina’s future adjudication of 102(b)(7)
claims less than certain,82 Delaware’s allowance of exculpated
director-defendants to move for dismissal at the outset of cases
suggests that North Carolina courts may follow suit.83 Absent
exculpation, officers are denied the tactical litigation advantages

lawsuits against directors and officers are brought because the financial failure of the
corporation leaves them as the only potentially deep pockets.”).
76. Carlton & Brooks, supra note 75, at 58.
77. See supra note 21.
78. Carlton & Brooks, supra note 75, at 58.
79. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8-51(e) (2015) (“Indemnification permitted under this
section in connection with a proceeding by or in the right of the corporation that is
concluded without a final adjudication on the issue of liability is limited to reasonable
expenses incurred in connection with the proceeding.”) (emphasis added).
80. See id.
81. See Richard B. Kapnick & Courtney A. Rosen, Using Exculpatory Clauses in
Defending Against Breach-of-Fiduciary-Duty Claims, 24:22 CORP. OFFICERS &
DIRECTORS LIABILITY: ANDREWS LITIG. REPORTER 1, 3 (Apr. 27, 2009).
82. For example, state courts in Illinois and Texas, while dismissing suits against
exculpated director-defendants, have not expressly relied on exculpatory clauses to do so.
See Shaper v. Bryan, 864 N.E.2d 876, 879 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (basing dismissal on the
plaintiffs’ failure to allege facts sufficient to rebut presumption of business judgment rule);
Elloway v. Pate, 238 S.W.3d 882, 896 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that the plaintiff failed
to produce evidence of defendants’ gross negligence).
83. A New York court, applying Delaware law, emphasized that the “great deference
given to the existence and legal effect of the exculpatory provision” seen in Delaware
cases like Malpiede v. Townson greatly influenced the analysis dismissing the complaint.
Kensington Int’l Ltd. v. Hiner, No. 602748/03, 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 9362, at *14 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Aug. 29, 2006).
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exculpatory clauses may provide and must further litigate duty of care
claims.84
B.

Excluding Officers from Exculpation Is More Costly Than It Is
Worth

Because the costs of statutorily precluding officers from
permissive exculpation likely outweigh the benefits that potential
liability for negligence has on officer behavior, permissive officer
exculpation should be allowed. Further, because the enforcement of
an officer’s duty of care85 ultimately comes via litigation,86 a system
using litigation as a check on behavior is justified only if it
accomplishes deterrence, compensation, or punishment.87 While it is
probable that exposure to potential liability deters some officers from
negligent behavior, the important question, as Professor Honabach88
notes, is whether the “marginal benefit of improved decision-making
[is] greater than the sum of the cost of increased caution in decisionmaking and the cost of actual litigation necessary to make the threat
of litigation credible.”89 This Recent Development asserts that those
two costs—decision-making caution and actual litigation—make the
preclusion of officers from permissive exculpation more expensive
than it is worth.
Because many powerful deterrents of negligent officer behavior
already exist,90 measuring the exact impact that potential liability (via
non-exculpation) for negligent acts has on officer behavior is difficult.
Despite the continued prevalence of corporate officer negligence in
the presence of non-litigation based deterrents, few doubt that such
deterrents nevertheless exist and influence officer behavior.91 When

84. See generally Kapnick & Rosen, supra note 81 (describing how exculpatory
clauses can be used to defend against breach of duty claims).
85. The relevant officer behavior regards breaches of care, not loyalty. Exculpating
officers for breaches of loyalty would violate public policy and create obviously perverse
incentives for officers to self-deal or otherwise be disloyal. This Recent Development does
not advocate for exculpation—permissive or otherwise—in such cases.
86. Honabach, supra note 54, at 332.
87. Id.
88. Professor Honabach is a leading scholar on director and author liability and a
joint author of West’s D&O Liability Handbook. See supra note 66.
89. Honabach, supra note 54, at 334.
90. Id. at 332. Such deterrents include: loss of reputation, loss of employment, desire
to conform to cultural norms, and a desire to comport with ethical standards. In publicly
traded companies, significant disclosures mandated by the SEC likely further deter
negligent officer behavior. See generally Matthew R. King et. al., Securities Fraud, 46 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1027, 1028–29 (2009) (discussing SEC disclosure requirements).
91. Honabach, supra note 54, at 332–33.

94 N.C. L. REV. 2155(2016)

2166

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94

considering the existing and cost-free deterrents already in place,92
the additional value of holding officers liable for ordinary negligence
seems marginal at best.93
Even if holding officers liable by withholding exculpation adds
significant deterrence-based value, its benefits are still likely
outweighed by its costs because some risk-taking will be shifted to
directors.94 Statutory schemes where directors but not officers can be
exculpated “simply encourage officers to place more decisions in the
hands of the board, and to take fewer, and less risky, initiatives on
their own, so as to avoid liability.”95 This makes delegation from the
board to officers challenging and makes board service more timeintensive and costly to corporations.96 It also may encourage officers,
when they do make discretional decisions, to be overly cautious in
their decision making to the detriment of the corporation.97
Rippy highlights the costly shift in risk-taking, from officers to
directors, sometimes engendered by schemes exculpating only
directors.98 In Rippy, the two non-director officers were the vice
president of mortgage lending and the chief operating officer99—
positions requiring technical expertise and financial acumen.
Conversely, six director-defendants, according to the complaint,100
had no such expertise yet still participated in the loan approval
process.101 Would the decision-making process and structure have

92. See supra note 90.
93. This Recent Development is not examining the effect of non-exculpation on
officer behavior in a vacuum. Hence, the relevant inquiry concerns the marginal effect that
non-exculpation has on officer behavior within the context of the current statutory scheme.
Crucially, the current officer protections (i.e. D&O insurance, indemnity, and the business
judgment rule) reduce the value of non-exculpation as a deterrent because each of those
protections overlap to some extent with the protections exculpation provides. In other
words, adding permissive exculpation to the protections already available to officers will
likely have little effect on their behavior. Paradoxically, the more officers are already
protected, the more it makes sense (from a cost-benefit paradigm) to allow permissive
exculpation. While the benefits of withholding exculpation (in the current statutory
scheme) are small, the high costs of withholding exculpation (and seeking to impose
liability) stay the same.
94. Hamermesh & Sparks, supra note 32, at 875. (“[A] default rule that would place
officers at substantially greater risk of care-based liability than the risk faced by directors
would impinge upon the board’s managerial prerogative[.]”).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Honabach, supra note 54, at 333. Of course, a lack of exculpation will not always
encourage cautious behavior.
98. FDIC ex rel. Coop. Bank v. Rippy, 799 F.3d 301, 313 (4th Cir. 2015).
99. Complaint, supra note 23, at 3.
100. Id. at 2–3.
101. Rippy, 799 F.3d at 313.
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looked differently if the non-director officers were exculpated? While
the answer to this question is difficult to ascertain, it seems likely that
a reason102 for the non-director officers’ unwillingness to lead the
loan-approval process may have been their lack of liability protection
relative to the directors.103
Another cost of withholding officer exculpation is the literal cost
of enforcement. Because corporate litigation is so expensive,104 there
is good reason to believe that, at least in some cases, shareholders
would want to prevent liability litigation directed at corporate
officers.105 Notably, even when officers are found liable for ordinary
negligence and are compelled to render monetary damages, merely
shifting money from negligent officers to angry shareholders does not
add value to the company.106 Because officers must at times be sued to
make the lack of officer exculpation even a marginally effective
deterrent and because such litigation is painfully expensive, the
“benefit” of precluding officers from exculpation likely is outweighed
by its pecuniary cost.107
Rippy illustrates the marginal value of holding officers liable for
ordinary negligence in duty of care cases. In Rippy, the non-director
officers108 committed potentially negligent acts even though they were
not exculpated.109 The exculpated directors committed the same
acts.110 The fact that the non-exculpated officers acted in the same
manner as their exculpated director colleagues suggests that potential
officer liability via non-exculpation111 played a relatively small role in
shaping officer behavior regarding individual loan decisions.112 The
102. It is also likely that the relatively small size of the company played a role in
blurring the roles of Cooperative’s management.
103. See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text.
104. No one knows exactly how much is spent each year on corporate litigation.
However, a 2010 survey of Fortune 200 companies revealed that respondents spent an
average of nearly $115 million per year on litigation in 2008—up 73% from $66 million per
year in 2000. U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, LITIGATION COST
SURVEY OF MAJOR COMPANIES 2 (2010) (reporting at the 2010 Conference on Civil
Litigation at Duke Law School).
105. Honabach, supra note 54, at 332.
106. Indeed, Honabach correctly points out that litigation costs incurred to bring
about the shift in monies are a deadweight loss. Id. at 334.
107. See supra notes 104–106 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 24.
109. FDIC ex rel. Coop. Bank v. Rippy, 799 F.3d 301, 313 (4th Cir. 2015).
110. See id. at 313.
111. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
112. It is important to distinguish between the lack of officer exculpation’s effect on
the structure of the decision-making process and the lack of officer exculpation’s effect on
individual decisions. As has been noted, non-officer exculpating schemes often engender
atypical corporate decision-making structures by encouraging officers to share the risks of
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tenuous connection between the deterrent effect of potential liability
pursuant to non-exculpation and actual officer behavior makes the
exclusion of officers from permissive exculpation hard to justify from
a cost-benefit standpoint. While the benefits of officer nonexculpation are probably marginal and often unclear, the cost of
attempting to impose liability on officers in non-exculpation schemes
has not been ambiguous.113
C.

The Current Lack of Officer Exculpation Allows for Inequitable
and Confusing Outcomes as between Directors and Officers

Because officers and directors have the same duties of care and
fiduciary duties, allowing permissive officer exculpation will engender
fairer outcomes and less confusing jurisprudence. Directors have a
duty to act in good faith and with ordinary care.114 As the Rippy court
noted,115 officers116 are held to an identical standard.117 Directors and
officers also have the same fiduciary duties.118 Further, in some cases,

decision-making with directors. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. However, once
the decision-making structure is in place and decision-making duties are shared, the lack
of exculpation for officers but not directors likely plays a negligible role in determining the
outcome of individual decisions. The reasons for this are not entirely clear, but it is
possible that officers believe that sharing their decision-making burden with directors
affords them the same protections as directors, at least in regards to jointly-made
decisions. In states without permissive officer exculpation, of course—and as
Cooperative’s officers painfully learned—this is simply not the case.
113. While the exact amount of the legal fees is unknown, the Rippy litigation has
spanned four years and involved dozens of attorneys from at least five law firms. See
Rippy, 799 F.3d at 306, 309.
114. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8-30(a) (2015) (“A director shall discharge his duties as
a director, including his duties as a member of a committee: (1) In good faith; (2) With the
care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar
circumstances; and (3) In a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the
corporation.”).
115. Rippy, 799 F.3d at 311.
116. The statute applies to officers “with discretionary authority.” N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 55-8-42(a) (2015). While there is some debate as to which officers should be deemed to
have discretionary authority under the statute, there is no doubt that the officers in Rippy
had such authority. Complaint, supra note 23, at 14–15 (discussing officer approval of
loans).
117. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8-42 (2015) (providing the identical standard of care for
officers as is given for directors in § 55-8-30). Of course, the application of the duty of care
standard for officers and directors can vary greatly depending on, among other things, the
level of knowledge officers have relative to directors. See infra Section III.A.
118. See Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708–09 (Del. 2009) (holding that officers
have identical fiduciary duties as directors); see also State v. Custard, No. 06 CVS 4622,
2010 WL 1035809, at *28 (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 19, 2010).
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officers and directors are responsible for the same tasks.119 Because
the duty of care and fiduciary duties imposed on directors and officers
are the same,120 it follows that permissible statutory protections for
each group should likewise be congruous.
The Rippy facts are especially illustrative of the inequities
inherent in holding officers and directors to the same standards but
affording them different levels of protection. In Rippy, there were
nine defendants—one director/officer, six directors, and two
officers.121 Both the district and appellate courts generally examined
the defendants’ actions in the aggregate without distinguishing
between officer and director behavior.122
In FDIC v. Willetts,123 the Eastern District of North Carolina
repeatedly referred to and analyzed the defendants as a group;
specifically, the court referred to “the decisions of defendants” when
discussing the business judgment rule.124 The court further considered
“whether defendants employed” a rational process in making loans125
and later examined whether the challenged “actions of the
defendants” could be attributed to a rational business purpose.126 In
eventually ruling in favor of the defendants, the Willetts court did not
discuss any differences between director and officer behavior.127
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit similarly failed to
distinguish between directors and officers when examining conduct.128
The Rippy court observed that “Bank management promised to
address the issues” highlighted in the CAMELS reports.129 The Rippy
court also noted that the joint report alleged that “Cooperative’s

119. Ironically, while the jurisprudential impact of Van Gorkom concerned directors,
much of the actual criticized behavior was arguably behavior normally attributed to
officers. Lamb & Christensen, supra note 32, at 56 n.51.
120. See supra notes 114–118.
121. See supra notes 23–24.
122. See infra notes 123–130 and accompanying text.
123. 48 F. Supp. 3d 844 (E.D.N.C. 2014).
124. Willetts, 48 F. Supp. 3d at 850 (emphasis added).
125. Id. (emphasis added).
126. Id. at 851 (emphasis added).
127. Id. A reason for the Willetts court’s lack of differentiation between director and
officer behavior likely stemmed from their interpretation of the business judgment rule—
an interpretation the Rippy court explicitly rejected. Id.
128. As previously noted, the Rippy court distinguished between officers and directors
for the purposes of exculpation eligibility. FDIC ex rel. Coop. Bank v. Rippy, 799 F.3d 301,
313 (4th Cir. 2015) (“[Cooperative]’s exculpatory provision does not cover Bank
officers.”). See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
129. Rippy, 799 F.3d at 308 (emphasis added). See supra note 15 (explaining
CAMELS).
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management” had ignored previously raised concerns.130 The Rippy
court’s analysis deserves a nuanced examination.
First, the Rippy court found that directors and officers could be
sued for ordinary negligence.131 Next, they applied the exculpatory
provision, which pertained only to the directors.132 Because the
exculpatory provision did not apply to officers, the Rippy court then
examined officer behavior in the context of the business judgment
rule.133 The court did not readily distinguish between officer and
director behavior in their discussion of the business judgment rule—
the director behavior was simply considered irrelevant pursuant to
the exculpatory provision.134 However, the expert FDIC witness, used
by the plaintiff to rebut the initial presumption that the defendants
acted with due care, testified that “the review process was
inconsistent with practices at other banking institutions, and did not
comport with his understanding of officer and director duties.”135
Hence, the behavior that removed the officer-defendants from the
protection of the business judgment rule would likely have had the
same inculpatory effect on the directors in the absence of an
exculpatory clause. Cooperative’s directors were not protected
because they acted differently or knew less than the officers; they
were protected via statute.
A closer examination of the defendants’ behavior in Rippy
further highlights the confusion that can arise when directors, but not
officers, are exculpated. In Rippy, defendant Frederick Willetts was
both president and chairman of the Board.136 That is, he was both an
officer and a director.137 Such role duality can be problematic when
assessing the applicability of exculpatory clauses. As one
commentator has noted, “[an exculpatory] statute that applies only to
directors creates the possibility that directors who are also officers
may face personal liability for their actions as officers, but not as
130. Id. (emphasis added).
131. Id. at 311.
132. See supra note 30.
133. Rippy, 799 F.3d at 313.
134. This Recent Development does not argue that the Rippy court’s interpretation of
§ 55-2-02 of the North Carolina General Statutes was per se faulty and should have been
otherwise conducted; the Rippy court did not meaningfully distinguish between officer and
director behavior because the current statutory scheme does not require such an analysis.
Allowing permissive exculpation for directors and officers would require courts to look
separately at both groups’ behavior to determine whether either or both groups could
legitimately receive exculpation.
135. Rippy, 799 F.3d at 313 (emphasis added).
136. Complaint, supra note 23, at 2.
137. Id.
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directors. This would mean that only outside directors, as a practical
matter, would benefit from the statutory limitation on liability.”138 By
allowing exculpation for directors but not officers, state legislatures—
in cases dealing with director and officer liability—leave questions139
regarding exculpation eligibility unanswered. Such messy, and
potentially litigious,140 questions could be avoided in a statutory
scheme allowing officer exculpation.
III. COUNTERARGUMENTS
A. “Officers and Directors Are Not the Same and Should Be Treated
Differently”
In the Monopoly game analogy, the distinction made between
players was arbitrary.141 Some commentators have suggested that, for
the purposes of imposing liability, directors and officers are different
in salient ways and should therefore receive different levels of
protection.142 They essentially contend that officers’ proximity to
decision-making (relative to directors) justifies placing on them a
different (non-arbitrary) standard for exculpation eligibility.143
Further, the argument goes, viewing officer-director liability in the
principal-agent paradigm (with officers as agents) provides a
meaningful differentiation between the two groups and a coherent
structure with which to evaluate conduct.144

138. Mark A. Sargent, Symposium: Two Cheers for the Maryland Director and Officer
Liability Statute, 18 UNIV. BALT. L. REV. 278, 304 (1989).
139. Several questions remain unanswered: Was Willetts acting as a director or an
officer when he approved eight out of the nine commercial real estate loans in question?
Should he be exculpated for some acts but not others? How should courts decide? Is
directorship dispositive and therefore wholly exculpatory? See Complaint, supra note 23,
at 2.
140. See In re Capital One Derivative S’holder Litig., 979 F. Supp. 2d 682, 691 (E.D.
Va. 2013) (“[Defendant-officer/CEO] cannot be liable for breaches of the duty of care
when he acts as a director. It follows that to state a claim against [defendant officer–CEO]
for breach of the duty of care where, as here, there are no allegations of bad faith,
intentional misconduct, or knowing violation of the law, plaintiffs must plead facts
plausibly alleging that he acted solely in his capacity as an officer, thereby removing his
actions from protection under the exculpatory clause.”).
141. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
142. See Lyman P. Q. Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why Corporate Officers Are
Fiduciaries, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597, 1603 (2005).
143. Id. (“Recalling the agency law status of corporate officers . . . clarifies immensely
why courts can and should scrutinize officer conduct more closely than they now review
director performance—i.e., the fiduciary duties of agents are more demanding than those
of directors, and officers rightly face a greater risk of personal liability for misconduct.”).
144. See id. at 1602.
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It is true that, in some cases, officer and director functions are
sufficiently different to justify imposing disparate standards for
liability.145 This is especially true in corporations with boards
containing a significant proportion of outside directors.146 In such
cases,147 information asymmetry or effective CEO control148 over the
board may justify allowing permissive exculpation for directors but
not officers.149 However, that officer and director roles are sufficiently
different in some corporations150 to impose different standards for
liability does not imply that such differences universally exist. As
Cooperative’s management structure illustrates,151 some corporations
intermingle classic director duties with quintessential officer
responsibilities and vice versa. When this occurs, corporations should
have the opportunity to impose the same liability standard on officers
as they do on directors via permissive exculpation.152 That single
145. Such cases include companies where outside directors comprise a significant
portion of the board. Because “[b]eing an outside director is a part-time job[,]” outside
directors have less time to review the information they have. Troy A. Paredes, Too Much
Pay, Too Much Deference: Behavioral Corporate Finance, CEOs, and Corporate
Governance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 673, 724–25 (2005). Outside directors also have
limited access personnel who might help them vet important issues and must otherwise
depend on the CEO and other high-ranking officers to supply crucial information. Id. at
725.
146. Id.
147. See, e.g., McPadden v. Sidhu, 964 A.2d 1262, 1273–76 (Del. Ch. 2008) (holding
that directors who placed non-director CEO in charge of the acquisition process were not
liable for negligence, while CEO with conflict of interest was liable for breach of care and
loyalty).
148. SEC Commissioner Cynthia Glassman stated that the “closed nomination process
dominated by powerful CEOs, and the entrenchment of directors, . . . [leads] to an
unhealthy coziness in some instances between ostensibly independent directors and the
executives whose performance they [are] supposed to oversee.” Cynthia A. Glassman,
Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Issues Surrounding the SEC’s Shareholder Access
Proposal (Mar. 8, 2004). See Johnson & Millon, supra note 142, at 1613–14 (arguing that
the “overly ‘cozy’ relationship between boards of directors and senior officers . . . may
result in a corporate culture in which directors do not regard officers as persons owing
high fiduciary duties to the corporation”).
149. See Paredes, supra note 145, at 725.
150. This Recent Development concedes that officer exculpation may not be
appropriate in corporations where director and officer roles and responsibilities are
sufficiently distinguishable and separate. See supra note 117.
151. See supra notes 99–101 and accompanying text.
152. Whether courts should be able to intervene in cases where the articles of
incorporation are insufficiently tailored to a corporation’s management structure is
beyond the scope of this Recent Development. However, given the deference traditionally
afforded corporations regarding business decisions, it seems likely that courts should
generally allow even poorly tailored articles to remain in effect. See generally Susanna M.
Kim, The Provisional Director Remedy for Corporate Deadlock: A Proposed Model
Statute, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 111, 138–40 (2003) (discussing judicial intervention and
rewriting of corporations’ articles of incorporation in deadlock situations). Because
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persons working in relatively smaller companies continue to share
director and officer titles further underscores the importance of
allowing corporations the kind of bylaw flexibility permissive officer
exculpation provides.
B.

“Officers Already Have Adequate Protection from Liability”

Another argument against officer exculpation is that the
protections already afforded them adequately insulate them from
liability. While indemnity, director and officer (“D&O”) insurance,153
and the business judgment rule undoubtedly protect officers, such
protections may be inadequate when officer and director behavior are
indistinguishable from each other. As has been shown,
indemnification is inferior to exculpation as a liability shield.154 D&O
insurance can mitigate officer exposure, but is inferior to exculpation
in many of the same ways that indemnification is.155 Finally, the
business judgment rule provides some common law protection for
decisions made in good faith.156 However, as Rippy illustrates, just
because officer conduct is evaluated in light of the business judgment
rule does not preclude liability in cases of ordinary negligence.157
Because the current available officer protections—though not
inconsequential—are inferior to the protections available via
exculpation,158 shareholders should have the option of providing the
judicial intervention regarding poorly tailored articles would require an evaluation of
shareholders’ decision to exculpate officers, it seems likely that courts would be hesitant to
do so.
153. D&O insurance can in some cases cover liability where indemnification cannot.
See Lamb & Christensen, supra note 32, at 70.
154. See supra Section II.A.
155. Namely, D&O insurance does not provide the tactical litigation advantages which
exculpation does and requires insured defendants to seek, and in some cases negotiate
with, insurers to settle the claims made against them. D&O insurance is also not available
in cases where the corporation brings suit against management. Hamermesh & Sparks,
supra note 32, at 871 & n.42 (“[D]irector and officer liability insurance policies uniformly
include an ‘insured v. insured’ exclusion, denying coverage where the corporation itself
initiates the claim against the officer.”).
156. See supra note 32.
157. FDIC ex rel. Coop. Bank v. Rippy, 799 F.3d 301, 313–14 (4th Cir. 2015).
158. While there are significant differences in protection between exculpation and
existing officer liability shields, it may not be reasonable to assume that officers’
familiarity (or lack thereof) with these differences will effectuate a meaningful difference
in their behavior. Hence, while exculpation is clearly legally superior to existing officer
protections, it is likely that allowing officer exculpation would not significantly further
deter negligent officer behavior. See supra note 93. Hence, that the high degree of overlap
between exculpation and other available protections makes non-exculpation a marginally
less valuable deterrent of negligent behavior does not necessarily beg the conclusion that
the differences between exculpation and other protections are legally insignificant. Id.

94 N.C. L. REV. 2155(2016)

2174

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94

highest protection to officers when the management structure of their
corporation renders director and officer functions indistinguishable.
CONCLUSION
When officers and directors have the same information,
functions, standard of care, and fiduciary duties, they should be
afforded the same protections. Nominal nonconformity alone does
not justify imposing disparate standards for liability. Unfortunately,
the NCBCA, as it is currently codified and understood, allows for
disparate exculpation eligibility treatment based on just such titular
technicalities.159
While the actual differences between officers and directors in
some cases are largely technical, the differences between the
protections afforded them are material and significant.160 Rippy
represents these problematic differences in liability protection.161
Further, while the gap between officers and directors is significant,
the marginal effect on officer behavior that potential liability for
negligence via non-exculpation may have is likely outweighed by the
costs of enforcing the current statutory scheme.162 In addition to being
costly, the current lack of officer exculpation allows for inequitable
and confusing outcomes as between directors and officers.163
While this Recent Development argues for the expansion of
officer protections, it does so only in a narrow set of circumstances.
Exculpation—for officers and directors—should only be available for
non-grossly negligent breaches of care.164 Self-dealing, fraudulent,
embezzling, or reckless officers would receive no respite under the
proposed change.165 Further, the proposed amendment calls for
allowance of permissive officer exculpation. Shareholders—those
most sensitive to any potential negative effects of exculpation—would
be the arbiters of this important corporate governance question.
While it is difficult to predict in what circumstances shareholders
would opt for officer exculpation, this Recent Development suggests

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Rippy, 799 F.3d at 313.
See supra Section II.A.
See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text.
See supra Section II.B.
See supra Section II.C.
See supra note 85.
See supra note 85.
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that such exculpation is appropriate when officer and director duties
and functions are significantly intermingled.166
The economic, theoretical, and policy justifications for allowing
director exculpation apply, at least in some cases, to officers. For
those reasons, North Carolina should follow the example of states167
that have recognized this by amending the NCBCA to allow
permissive officer exculpation.
JORDAN C. HILTON**

166. See FDIC ex rel. Coop. Bank v. Rippy, 799 F.3d 301, 313 (4th Cir. 2015);
Complaint, supra note 23, at 2–3.
167. See supra note 65.
** I am thankful to Thomas Hazen for his valuable insight.

